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INTRODUCTION 
Whether to detain or release a defendant in a federal criminal case can 
be among the most challenging decisions federal judges face.  Detention 
hearings present courts with a wide variety of factual circumstances 
 
 * Gabriel A. Fuentes is a U.S. magistrate judge in the Northern District of Illinois, sitting 
in Chicago. Before his appointment in May 2019, Judge Fuentes was a partner at the Chicago 
law firm of Jenner & Block LLP and an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Chicago. He has written 
and spoken about the use and misuse of science in criminal cases. The author extends his 
appreciation to law clerks Tamar Karsh-Fogel, Melanie Berkowitz, and Joshua Hutton, along 
with judicial assistant Patricia Hagenmaier, courtroom deputy Jenny Jauregui, and researcher 
Patricia Fuentes for their substantial research and logistical support that made this Article 
possible. The author’s views are his own and not necessarily those of any U.S. District Court, 
and nothing in the Article is intended to suggest how the author might rule on any question 
that may come before him. 
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surrounding defendants and their personal histories, their charged offenses, 
the evidence against them, the ways in which their detention or release might 
bear upon the community’s safety, and the likelihood that they will appear in 
court.  At least that much is the black letter law.1  But as the novel coronavirus 
known as SARS-CoV-2 raced through the United States in the winter and 
spring of 2020, touching off widespread infections of the disease labeled 
COVID-19, a new challenge arose with respect to federal arrestees and 
defendants already in detention.  Citing the threat of COVID-19 infection, 
many defense attorneys began aggressively pushing for release of their 
clients.  Certainly, they argued, the situation had changed: detaining new 
defendants in jail environments could put both defendants and jail staff at 
greater risk of infection, and potentially trigger a mass outbreak that could 
affect not only individual jails but the communities and health-care systems 
around them.  In the first weeks of the pandemic, early decisions indicate that 
judges are responding to the challenge in different ways.  This Article offers 
a framework for considering defendants’ arguments for release based on the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  It suggests that the shifting landscape of facts and 
scientific knowledge about this disease, as well as governmental responses 
to it, challenge practitioners and courts to grapple with an additional layer of 
complexity in applying the Bail Reform Act and the Constitution to federal 
detention decisions.  It is now crucial for courts to push past the parties’ 
representations and into the facts and science behind them.  The challenge is 
to try to rely on our experience to search for the line between the known and 
unknown about the risk this new virus poses in jail environments, by 
venturing past the open grasslands in a hunt for the less visible “wild facts” 
lurking in the forest.  The lore of “wild facts,” an abstract concept first 
articulated in the early twentieth century by philosopher William James, tells 
us that “wild facts” are “subtle, unexpected particulars” that lie not in law but 
in human experience, and that militate against the mechanical and impersonal 
application of a society’s laws.2  Now that COVID-19 has injected a new 
level of complexity into federal detention decisions, this Article uses the 
“wild facts” concept as an inspiration for meeting the new challenge of 
complexity in federal detention.  Using Richard Posner’s modern take on 
“realism” versus “formalism” as a guide to defining today’s “wild facts,” this 
Article proposes an intellectually inquisitive approach, which bases decisions 
on science and facts, including facts that may require effort to unearth, as 
they may be, if not transformative, at least significant enough to affect 
 
 1 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2018). 
 2 Edmond Cahn, Jerome Frank’s Fact-Skepticism and Our Future, 66 YALE L.J. 824, 827 
(1957). 
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decisions materially.3  Tested against judges’ experience, this brand of “wild 
facts” might lead to decisions that withstand the daily onslaught of new 
information about the virus, because these facts are tethered to the reality, to 
the extent it can be known, of COVID-19’s impact on prisoners, jail 
populations, and surrounding communities. 
I. VIRUSES AND THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
Before discussing how judges may respond to bail arguments based on 
the novel coronavirus, we should have a basic understanding of how viruses, 
and the virus that causes COVID-19 in particular, work.  Viruses are all 
around us.  They are part of an unseen world that teems with microbes so tiny 
that researchers barely knew about them before the first half of the 20th 
Century.4 
[I]magine that you have powerful glasses allowing you to perceive any and all 
microbes. If you were to put on such magical bug-vision specs, you would instantly see 
a whole new, and very active, world. The floor would seethe, the walls would throb, 
and everything would swarm with formerly invisible life. Tiny bugs would blanket 
every surface–your coffee cup, the pages of the book on your lap, your actual lap. The 
larger bacteria would themselves teem with still smaller bugs. This alien army is 
everywhere, and some of its most powerful soldiers are its smallest. These smallest of 
bugs have integrated themselves, quite literally, into every stitch of the fabric of earthly 
life . . . . They are viruses.5 
These tiny viruses attach themselves to cells, including those of humans.  
They invade those cells and “hijack[] the cellular processes to produce virally 
encoded protein that will replicate the virus’s genetic material.”6  To 
complete their life cycle, viruses spread to infect the cells of new hosts.7  As 
viruses move from host to host, their genetic makeup mutates with 
remarkable frequency, thus increasing the odds of evading their hosts’ 
immune systems and anti-viral drugs.8  Meanwhile, their genetic makeup 
may reassort or recombine, creating entirely new viruses and thus “a rapid 
and radical way” for viruses “to create novelty.”9  The word “novel,” when 
used to describe coronaviruses and humans’ vulnerability to them, means that 
 
 3 RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 5–6, 92 (2013). 
 4 NATHAN WOLFE, THE VIRAL STORM 19–21 (2011). 
 5 Id. at 21–22. 
 6 Fredric S. Cohen, How Viruses Invade Cells, 110 BIOPHYSICAL J. 1028, 1028 (2016) 
 7 WOLFE, supra note 4, at 26–28. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 35; Evolution of Viruses, KHAN ACAD. (2020), https://www.khanacademy.org/scie
nce/biology/biology-of-viruses/virus-biology/a/evolution-of-viruses [https://perma.cc/UJM2-
3TJV]. 
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the virus is new to humans, whose immune systems do not immediately 
recognize it as an invader.10 
SARS-CoV-2, the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, is thought 
to spread between people primarily “through respiratory droplets produced 
when an infected person coughs, sneezes, or talks.”11  These droplets can 
then enter nearby people through contact with their mouths or nose; if the 
droplets are not inhaled, they can land on nearby surfaces.12  When new 
persons touch those surfaces and then touch their own mouths, noses, or eyes, 
the virus continues to spread.13  SARS-CoV-2 has been found to be 
detectable in aerosols for up to three hours, on copper for up to four hours, 
on cardboard for up to 24 hours, and on plastic and stainless steel surfaces 
for up to two to three days.14 
The capacity of a virus to spread from one person to another is measured 
by its “basic reproductive number,” or R0, which is calculated by the number 
of new victims per prior victim.15  The R0 for SARS-CoV-2 has been 
 
 10 Katie Kerwin McCrimmon, Viruses 101: Why the new coronavirus is so contagious and 
how we can fight it, UCHEALTH TODAY (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.uchealth.org/today/vir
uses-101-why-the-new-coronavirus-is-so-contagious-how-to-fight-it/ [https://perma.cc/XR4
2-Q8RP] 
 11 How COVID-19 Spreads, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) (last reviewed Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.cdc.go
v/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html [https://perma.cc/6B
L4-FG76]. 
 12 The Centers for Disease Control has said that close contact, or a distance of less than 
about six feet, produces a risk of transmission of the virus. Id. But experts also have said that 
although six feet is a “sensible and useful minimum distance,” the farther away the better, 
because aerosolized respiratory droplets may carry more than six feet in some environments, 
and some persons may be more vulnerable to infection from such aerosols. Knvul Sheikh et 
al., Stay 6 Feet Apart, We’re Told. But How Far Can Air Carry Coronavirus?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/health/coronavirus-six-feet.html 
[https://perma.cc/649M-3KDF]. 
 13 See supra note 11. 
 14 New coronavirus stable for hours on surfaces, NAT’L INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (Mar. 17, 
2020) (citing Neeltje van Doremalen et al., Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 
compared to SARS-CoV-1, 382 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1564 (2020)), https://www.nih.gov/new
s-events/news-releases/new-coronavirus-stable-hours-surfaces [https://perma.cc/QAX6-9Z
99]. But see Euan Tovey, Can You Get the Coronavirus from Receiving Parcels or Having 
Your Smartphone Out?, SCI. ALERT, https://www.sciencealert.com/can-you-get-the-
coronavirus-from-receiving-parcels-or-having-your-smartphone-out [https://perma.cc/5QL3-
S9HG] (stating that viral stability estimates in van Doremalen et al., supra, “might be 
underestimates” and that the “virus may survive even longer on these surfaces, depending on 
conditions,” because “these studies looked at how long the virus would survive when in a 
‘buffer’ (a solution in which viruses live in the lab) [instead of] [i]n real life, [where] they 
would be in mucous and would be more stable.”) 
 15 WOLFE, supra note 4, at 30. The expression is pronounced “r (naught).” 
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described as between 1.5 and 3.5, meaning that each infected person can be 
expected to infect roughly two or three people.16  If the R0 for an outbreak 
drops to below one, the virus will be unable to sustain itself and will die out.17  
The virus’s ability to induce symptoms (like coughing or sneezing) in its 
hosts—so that it may spread to new hosts—is one way it persists.18 
Not all viruses are deadly, but SARS-CoV-2 is.  As of early May 2020, 
COVID-19 had killed more than 80,000 persons in the United States as 
infections exceeded 1.3 million.19  The World Health Organization has 
labeled the global COVID-19 outbreak a “pandemic,” a word used by health 
experts to describe a new infectious agent that has spread to all continents 
except Antarctica.20  The SARS-CoV-2 virus can kill by attacking the lungs, 
triggering an immune-system response that can give rise to a condition 
known as Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome, in which cells in the lungs 
leak fluid, become inflamed, and smother the lungs’ ability to pass vital 
oxygen into the bloodstream.21  Researchers continue to learn more about the 
virus and its effects, which reportedly also can include potentially fatal 
strokes.22  As the state of our collective knowledge about SARS-CoV-2 
continues to evolve, even at this writing, the unprecedented nature of this 
pandemic has affected virtually all facets of American life, including the 
legal system. 
 
 16 Joseph Eisenberg, How Scientists Quantify the Intensity of an Outbreak Like COVID-
19, U. OF MICH. HEALTH LAB (Mar. 17, 2020), https://labblog.uofmhealth.org/rounds/how-sc
ientists-quantify-intensity-of-an-outbreak-like-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/CZ2T-KFG9]. The 
R0 for the highly infectious measles disease is in the range of 12 to 18. Id. 
 17 WOLFE, supra note 4, at 30. 
 18 Id. 
 19 COVID-19 Dashboard, JOHNS HOPKINS U. AND MED. (last updated May 11, 2020), 
https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html [https://perma.cc/KQ48-WVQS]. 
 20 Bill Chappell, Coronavirus: COVID-19 Is Now Officially A Pandemic, WHO Says, 
NPR (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/11/814474930/cor
onavirus-covid-19-is-now-officially-a-pandemic-who-says [https://perma.cc/VBN6-TQYT]; 
WOLFE, supra note 4, at 99. 
 21 David Heinzmann, When COVID-19 Attacks the Lungs, Ventilators Can Be a Patient’s 
Only Chance of Survival, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.chicagotribune.com/corona
virus/ct-coronavirus-ventilators-20200403-f5tmrqpmnfd53a6nezqlykjrvy-story.html [https://
perma.cc/TKX2-6KRC]. 
 22 Robert Glatter, Why Is COVID-19 Coronavirus Causing Strokes In Young And Middle-
Aged People?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertglatter/2020/04/2
7/why-is-covid-19-coronavirus-causing-strokes-in-young-and-middle-aged-people/#4a0c17e
c34df [https://perma.cc/YJB8-3CES]. 
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II. THE BAIL REFORM ACT, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COMPLEXITY 
OF COVID-19 
The Bail Reform Act of 198423 governs the release of pre-trial detainees 
on bail.  Under the Act, a judicial officer may order the release or detention 
of a defendant pending trial, depending on whether the government, in 
moving for detention at a detention hearing, has established either (1) by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that no condition or set of conditions of 
release will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant in court as 
required; or (2) by clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or set of 
conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any other person 
and the community.24  In making that determination, courts are to consider a 
set of statutory factors that include the nature of the offense, the defendant’s 
history, the weight of the evidence, and the potential impact release might 
have on public safety in light of the “available information.”25  The Act also 
erects a rebuttable presumption of detention under certain circumstances, 
most commonly when the judge finds probable cause to believe the defendant 
committed an offense with a maximum term of incarceration of 10 years or 
more under the Controlled Substances Act.26  The presumptions of 
 
 23 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3142. 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). The statute sets forth the “(g) factors” as follows: 
The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and 
the community, take into account the available information concerning— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime 
of violence, a violation of Section 1591, a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim 
or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or destructive device; 
(2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 
(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including— 
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, 
financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, 
history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning 
appearance at court proceedings; and 
(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on 
parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for 
an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and 
(4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed 
by the person’s release. 
Id. 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(2)–(3). The maximum sentence is more than ten years in prison for 
drug offenses charged in United States courts where the drug quantities trigger statutory 
minimum sentences. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (requiring minimum of five years and 
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dangerousness and flight risk are rebutted when defendants meet a burden of 
production by coming forward with at least some evidence that they will not 
flee or endanger the community if released.27 
The Bail Reform Act generally expresses a “preference for release,” in 
that Section 3142(e) requires the Court to consider the possibility of less 
restrictive alternatives to detention.28  In addition, Section 3142(b) provides 
that judges “shall” order release “unless the judicial officer determines that 
such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as 
required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.”29 
The Act also must be applied within constitutional limits.  Bail plainly 
may not be “excessive” under the Eighth Amendment.30  But the Supreme 
Court has also signaled that pretrial detention, where it is punitive, may 
violate the Constitution.  In United States v. Salerno, which held that 
detention under the Act does not violate due process, the Court cautioned that 
“[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without 
trial is the carefully limited exception.”31  Without expressing a particular 
view, the Supreme Court added in Salerno that there could be a “point at 
which detention in a particular case might become excessively prolonged, 
and therefore punitive, in relation to Congress’ regulatory goal.”32  
Punishment, therefore, is beyond what the constitution permits in pretrial 
detention.33  Constitutional protections for pretrial detainees remain, no 
 
maximum of forty years for person convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 100 grams 
or more of mixtures and substances containing heroin, or more than 500 grams or more of 
mixtures and substances containing cocaine). 
 27 United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1986). Although the 
defendant’s burden of production is “not a heavy one to meet,” a defendant’s meeting it does 
not erase the probable cause finding or the rebutted presumption, which “remains in the case 
as an evidentiary finding militating against release, to be weighed along with other evidence 
relevant to factors listed in Section 3142(g).” Id.; United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 
910, 917 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Perez-Franco, 839 F.2d 867, 870 (1st Cir. 1988). 
The burden of persuasion remains with the government once the defendant meets his burden 
of production to rebut the presumptions. Dominguez, 783 F.2d at 707. 
 28 United States v. Fattah, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136–37 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (citing United 
States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1991)). 
 29 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). 
 30 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 31 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 32 Id. at 747 n.4. 
 33 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (“Due process requires that a pretrial 
detainee not be punished.”). The Supreme Court stated in Bell that “[i]f a particular condition 
or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, 
it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” Id. at 539. Challenges to bail alleged to 
constitute punishment are reviewed as due process claims. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 
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matter how difficult the task of jail administration might be during a 
pandemic.34 
Similarly, federal courts have held, in limited circumstances, that 
pretrial detention may constitute punishment when jail officials place 
detainees in situations that pose specific threats to their life or health. These 
decisions have commonly arisen in the context of civil rights actions alleging 
that conditions of pretrial detention amounted to punishment as a 
constitutional tort.35  When distilled, these cases suggest that pretrial 
 
1864 (2017). In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015), the 
Supreme Court held that the standard for pre-trial detainees’ Due Process claims for excessive 
force was objective reasonableness and did not include a subjective intent or deliberate 
indifference element.  The circuit courts of appeal are split on whether Kingsley extends to 
pre-trial detainees’ conditions of confinement claims.  Compare Hardeman v. Curran, 933 
F.3d 816, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2019) (extending Kingsley to conditions claims and not requiring 
deliberate indifference showing); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 34–35 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(same); Mays v. Dart, No. 20 C 2134, 2020 WL 1987007, at *25 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2020) 
(following Hardeman to issue preliminary injunction requiring Cook County sheriff to 
undertake additional preventative measures to protect Cook County Jail prisoners from 
COVID-19) with Swain v. Junior, No. 20-11622-C, 2020 WL 2161317, at *4–5 (11th Cir. 
May 5, 2020) (holding that Eighth Amendment two-pronged standard, including deliberate 
indifference, applied to pre-trial detainees Due Process claim based on jail conditions amid 
the COVID-19 pandemic); Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420 n.4 
(5th Cir. 2017) (declining to extend Kingsley beyond excessive force claims by pre-trial 
detainees).   
 34 The enormity of the pandemic’s challenges to jail administration “does not mean, 
however, that constitutional protections fall by the wayside”: 
Government officials in our country are bound by constitutional requirements even when they are 
dealing with difficult and unfamiliar challenges to public health and safety. Persons accused of 
crimes who are detained pending trial do not shed their constitutional rights at the jailhouse 
door. The government has determined to lock them up pending determination of their guilt or 
innocence, and by doing so the government takes on an obligation to protect their health and 
safety. And it cannot be forgotten that by requiring this, we safeguard the health and safety of the 
community at large—from which the detainees have come and to which they and the officers 
guarding them will return. 
Mays v. Dart, No. 20 C 2134, 2020 WL 1812381, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2020). 
 35 Again, the circuits are split as to whether deliberate indifference to allegedly punitive 
jail conditions is a necessary hurdle for pre-trial detainees’ Due Process claims. See supra note 
33. If deliberate indifference is required for pre-trial detainees’ conditions claims, Due Process 
challenges to detention during the COVID-19 will almost never be successful.  See Mays, 
2020 WL 1987007, at *25 (plaintiffs raising Due Process challenge to conditions at Cook 
County Jail amid COVID-19 pandemic would be unlikely to prevail if deliberate indifference 
were required for such claims). Courts that have extended Kingsley to pre-trial detainees’ 
conditions claims have done so by reasoning that pre-trial detainees do not stand in the same 
shoes as convicted prisoners, so the standard for pre-trial detainees’ Due Process claims that 
they are being subjected to punishment must not be the same as the more stringent standard 
for convicted prisoners, who may be punished but not cruelly or unusually.  See Hardeman, 
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detention cannot be used to inflict harm or an unreasonable risk of harm upon 
detainees. 
Two additional aspects of the Act bear noting.  First, once a defendant 
is detained under Section 3142(e), Section 3142(i) provides that “[t]he 
judicial officer may, by subsequent order, permit the temporary release of the 
person, in the custody of a United States marshal or another appropriate 
person, to the extent that the judicial officer determines such release to be 
necessary for the preparation of the person’s defense or for another 
compelling reason.”36  The Act does not define any of Section 3142(i)’s key 
terms, including “appropriate person,” “necessary,” or “another compelling 
reason.”  Second, the Act allows defendants to re-open their detention 
hearings so that an earlier finding of detention may be revisited before trial 
if new information arises “bearing on the issue [of] whether there are 
conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of such 
person as required and the safety of any other person and the community.”37 
Thus the Bail Reform Act instructs judges to consider whether the 
government has met its applicable burden on the issues of whether release 
conditions can be fashioned to reasonably assure (1) the defendant’s 
appearance or (2) the safety of the community, considering the factors under 
Section 3142(g) and any applicable presumption.  The confluence of facts, 
including the release conditions proposed by the defendant, their efficacy, 
and the degree to which they might counterbalance facts weighing against 
release, can make for difficult calls. 
COVID-19, however, adds a new layer of complexity.  The pandemic 
challenges judges to decide detention motions not just through a traditional 
application of the Act, but with consideration of the state of quickly 
developing scientific findings about COVID-19 and its possible effect on jail 
 
933 F.3d at 824.  Imposing a deliberate indifference requirement in pre-trial detainees’ Due 
Process conditions claims allows courts to deny such claims mechanistically, by a mere 
showing that jail officials earnestly sought to protect them from harm, even if the resulting 
conditions remained objectively and unreasonably harmful. Judging the pre-trial detainees’ 
claims under a standard of objective reasonableness is, on the other hand, anything but 
mechanistic, because objective reasonableness turns on individualized facts and 
circumstances. Kingsley, 135 S. Ct at 2473 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 
(1989)).  Whether or not extending Kingsley to conditions cases is the better approach, 
requiring a deliberate indifference showing from pre-trial detainees in these cases is the more 
mechanistic approach and smacks of the kind of judicial “formalism” that this article counsels 
against.  See infra note 38, Part III(C).   
 36 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i) (emphasis added). 
 37 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2); see also United States v. Lee, No. 19-cr-298 (KBJ), 2020 WL 
1541049, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020) (finding that the worldwide spread of COVID-19 as a 
basis for re-opening detention determination under Section 3142(f) “cannot reasonably be 
disputed”). 
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populations and beyond.38  The Act itself directs judges to consider facts 
bearing on the consequences that detention or release might have, not only 
on the safety of individual detainees, but on the entire community.  The Act’s 
directive that courts consider the safety of any other person and the 
community leaves much room for judicial pragmatism in determining what 
is known and unknown about the novel coronavirus and its community 
spread in and from jail settings.  Some courts might hold that, taken to its 
logical conclusion, allowing COVID-19 to serve as a basis for release opens 
the floodgates and is a move best left to Congress.39  Others might grant a 
motion for release in light of COVID-19 based on a set of individualized 
factual determinations, such as the severity of a prisoner’s underlying 
medical conditions, and explicitly state that the decision “should not be 
construed as a determination by this Court that pretrial detention is unsafe or 
otherwise inappropriate as a general matter or in any other specific case.”40  
Still others may take stock of the public health risks said to be associated 
with detention and conclude that release is appropriate under the Bail Reform 
Act’s analysis of danger (from COVID-19) to the community, without 
expressing a concern about how their orders might affect other cases or open 
any floodgates.41  These are but a few of the approaches taken so far. 
Reversing a district court’s dismissal of a lawsuit asserting that officials 
at the Brooklyn Metropolitan Detention Center had violated prisoners’ Sixth 
 
 38 In this respect, detention decisions amid the COVID-19 pandemic push judges from 
what Judge Posner called “formalism”—the idea that judges can decide matters in a more 
mechanistic fashion—to his brand of “realism”: 
The realist places emphasis on the consequences of judicial rulings, and in that regard is pragmatic 
but only if the realist considers systemic as well as case-specific consequences and thus avoids 
shortsighted justice—justice responsive only to the “equities” of the particular case—and is 
analytical and empirical rather than merely intuitive and political. 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 5. 
 39 United States v. Villegas, No. 19-cr-568-AB, 2020 WL 1649520, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 
3, 2020). The court in Villegas stated: 
Judges cannot responsibly—much less legally—make what would essentially be momentous 
public health decisions for prisons under the pretense of individual pretrial release determinations. 
Defendants’ unbounded argument for pretrial release because of the COVID-19 pandemic, if 
accepted and extended to its logical conclusion, would mean the release—en masse—of all federal 
pretrial detainees. So it is up to Congress, not the courts, to legislate in the current crisis a 
comprehensive solution for the federal prison system at large. 
Id. 
 40 United States v. Perez, No. 19 CR 297 (PAE), 2020 WL 1329225, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
19, 2020). 
 41 See United States v. Davis, No. ELH-20-09, 2020 WL 1529158, at *8–10 (D. Md. Mar. 
30, 2020) (granting release on motion to re-open bail hearing under Section 3142(f), in partial 
reliance on letter from more than 200 public health experts about the risks of incarceration 
during the COVID-19 pandemic). 
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Amendment rights by restricting or cancelling attorney visits, the Second 
Circuit foreshadowed the gravity of the coming challenge posed by COVID-
19: 
As we write this opinion, a different and even more dramatic challenge is presented by 
COVID-19, a novel and easily transmitted viral disease that has prompted a rapid 
reorientation of workplace practices and social life in support of public health. The 
impact of this recent emergency on jail and prison inmates, their counsel (in the lead, 
the Federal Defenders), the United States Attorneys, and the BOP, including the 
individual Wardens and the personnel of each facility, is just beginning to be felt. Its 
likely course we cannot foresee. Present information strongly suggests, however, that 
it may be grave and enduring.42 
III. RISING TO THE CHALLENGE OF COMPLEXITY IN FEDERAL COVID-19 
BAIL DECISIONS 
Despite the new challenges presented by COVID-19, the analyses 
mandated under the Bail Reform Act withstand this time of pandemic.  
Courts must still weigh the rebuttable presumption of detention, if any, and 
consider the Section 3142(g) factors to decide whether a set of release 
conditions might reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the 
community.  The difference is that now, COVID-19 becomes a part of that 
analysis.43  For persons already confined under a detention order and seeking 
temporary release under Section 3142(i), courts must still determine whether 
release has become necessary to allow defendants to prepare their defenses 
or “for another compelling reason.”  Now, courts must consider whether 
COVID-19 could amount to such a reason.44  And as they did before, courts 
 
 42 Fed. Defenders of New York v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 19-1778, 2020 WL 
1320886, at *12 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 2020). 
 43 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 19-cr-298 (KBJ), 2020 WL 1541049, at *4 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 30, 2020) (finding that the pandemic did not change the nature and circumstances of the 
offense, the weight of the evidence, or the personal history and characteristics of a defendant 
who did not allege a particular medical vulnerability to COVID-19, and rejecting defendant’s 
argument that the potential dangerousness of his incarceration during the pandemic altered the 
court’s earlier detention finding based on the fourth 3142(g) factor requiring consideration of 
the nature and seriousness of the danger that release would pose to any person or the 
community); United States v. Fellela, No. 19-cr-79, 2020 WL 1457877, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 
20, 2020) (noting that under Bail Reform Act provision applicable to convicted defendants 
awaiting sentencing, “[i]n any event, Fellela’s motion requires me to consider whether he has 
established by clear and convincing evidence that he will not flee or pose a danger to any other 
person or to the community”). 
 44 In Lee, the court denied temporary release by concluding that COVID-19 was not a 
“compelling reason” under Section 3142(i), but the court left open the possibility of finding 
that it could be a “compelling reason” under different facts. 2020 WL 1541049, at *6. 
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must consider defendants’ due process protection from punishment.45  The 
question now, in light of COVID-19, is the degree to which the pandemic 
could or should affect the outcomes of bail decisions. 
This Article does not advocate for any particular outcome under any 
particular set of facts.  Rather, it examines how judicial decisions to date have 
treated relevant facts about detainees and the virus and suggests a legal 
realist’s holistic focus on facts and science, as the pandemic places judges 
under tremendous pressure to protect the public’s safety from the virus as 
well as from the risk associated with the release of certain defendants. 
A. THE BASIC ARGUMENTS FOR RELEASE BASED ON COVID-19 
Arguments for release based on COVID-19 can take several forms, 
summarized here: 
 
Section 3142(g) Arguments: 
(1) Personal risk of death or suffering based on underlying conditions: 
Defendants with medical infirmities or vulnerabilities might argue 
that they are more likely to die or endure greater suffering in the 
event they contract COVID-19 while in custody. This argument 
might also include a claim that these defendants are more likely to 
 
And it might well be the case that certain defendants—and here the Court is thinking primarily of 
those who have underlying medical conditions that make them especially vulnerable to the virus—
could become eligible for temporary release under the “another compelling reason” prong 
of section 3142(i) in light of the threat that the COVID-19 pandemic poses to them in particular. 
Id. 
 45 See United States v. Villegas, No. 19-cr-568-AB, 2020 WL 1649520, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 
Apr. 3, 2020) (rejecting due process punishment claim, stating, “there is no evidence of such 
arbitrary purpose and punitive intent here. To the contrary, the Bureau of Prisons is by all 
objective accounts responding to the COVID-19 pandemic as any reasonable observer could 
expect under the circumstances to prevent infectious outbreak, protect inmate health, and 
preserve internal order – all legitimate governmental aims”); United States v. Cox, No. 19-cr-
271, 2020 WL 1491180, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2020) (rejecting due process argument by 
concluding that notwithstanding a threat of COVID-19 infection in custody, “the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause simply asks whether the pretrial condition is reasonably 
related to a legitimate government interest”). Mays appears to have the better of that argument, 
not only because it accounts for Kingsley, but also because unlike convicted prisoners, whose 
punishment cannot be cruel or unusual, pre-trial detainees cannot be punished at all.  The 
standard for evaluating their conditions claims should be less demanding than Eighth 
Amendment standards.  See Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 824 (7th Cir. 2019) (referring 
to Eighth Amendment standard as “more demanding” that Due Process standard for pre-trial 
detainees’ conditions claims).  
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contract the disease or suffer more severe consequences from it 
because of their underlying conditions.46 
(2) Personal risk of harm based on living in a jail environment: 
Whether or not defendants have underlying medical conditions, 
they might argue that their detention, in and of itself, poses an 
unacceptable risk of actual harm to them because they are more 
likely to contract COVID-19 in a jail environment, which is 
arguably more conducive to the spread of the virus than other 
environments, including a home confinement they propose in lieu 
of detention.47 
(3) Risk of harm to jail staff and the surrounding community 
Defendants may also argue that their detention poses an 
unacceptable risk not just to their safety, but to the safety of jail 
staff who circulate in and out of the facilities and to the safety of 
other community members. Members of the public might be 
exposed to jail staff or might suffer the consequences of local 
medical care systems becoming stressed or overwhelmed by 
infected prisoners or those infected by them.48 
Section 3142(i) arguments: 
(1) Risk posed by the virus constitutes a “compelling reason” 
For any or all of the above reasons, defendants who previously 
were detained might argue that they should be permitted to re-open 
their bail hearings or be granted “temporary” release into the 
custody of an appropriate person under Section 3142(i) because the 




 46 See United States v. Michaels, No. SACR 16-76-JVS, 2020 WL 1482553, at *1 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 26, 2020) (granting temporary release to defendant who was “of an age and has 
medical conditions that place him in the group most susceptible to Covid-19.”); United States 
v. Perez, No. 19 CR 297 (PAE), 2020 WL 1329225, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) (granting 
temporary release to defendant amid COVID-19 pandemic “based on the unique confluence 
of serious health issues and other risk factors” that included defendant’s “serious progressive 
lung disease and other significant health issues”). 
 47 United States v. Stephens, No. 15-cr-95 (JAN), 2020 WL 1295155, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 19, 2020) (“Although there is not yet a known outbreak among the jail and prison 
populations, inmates may be at a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19 should an outbreak 
develop.”). 
 48 See United States v. Little, No. 20 CR 57, 2020 WL 1439979, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 
2020) (considering the total harm and benefit to prisoner and society from continued detention 
of detainee, and noting that “part of the ‘danger to the community’ calculus ha[s] to include 
the risk of a new inmate bringing the virus into the facility”) (citing United States v. Raihan, 
20 CR 68 (BMC) (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2020)). 
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(2) Necessary for preparation of a person’s defense 
If new measures implemented to prevent the spread of COVID-19 
have impacted defendants’ access to their attorneys, defendants 
may also argue that release is necessary for preparation of their 
defense.49 
All but one of these arguments are premised on the idea that jail 
facilities are more conducive, or highly conducive, to the spread of COVID-
19.  They posit that detainees face a higher generalized risk of infection or of 
severe consequences from an infection, and that the public faces a risk from 
the prospect of an outbreak within a jail.  This generalized risk stems from 
the crowded and cramped nature of jail facilities, which are contended to be 
unsuited to “social distancing,” frequent hand-washing, and other preventive 
measures that local and/or federal officials have urged the general public to 
undertake to reduce their risk of contracting or spreading COVID-19.50 
In some cases, defendants have been able to point to existing infections 
within their area of confinement.51  It is possible that by the time this Article 
is published, more persons opposing detention or moving for release might 
be arguing that outbreaks inside their facilities justify release.  The number 
 
 49 See Stephens, 2020 WL 1295155, at *3 (granting release under Section 3142(i) because 
of the impact of BOP restrictions on the defendant’s ability to meet with his attorney). 
 50 A district court that granted injunctive relief directed at conditions and infection-control 
measures at Cook County Jail in Chicago referred to expert testimony and affidavits submitted 
by the prisoner plaintiffs as having reiterated an assertion by the live plaintiffs’ expert in that 
case, former New York City jails medical director Dr. Homer Venters, that the design of 
correctional facilities “promotes transmission of the coronavirus because it densely packs 
large groups of people together.” Mays, 2020 WL 1987007, at *12. The court further 
summarized the plaintiffs’ expert affiants’ assertions, including those of Yale University 
epidemiologist Dr. Gregg Gonsalves, as follows: 
Dr. Gonsalves stated that although correctional facilities are like cruise ships in that they are 
enclosed environments, they present an even higher risk of rapid transmission of the coronavirus 
because of “conditions of crowding, the proportion of vulnerable people detained, and often scant 
medical care resources.” In a joint declaration, five medical doctors with experience working in a 
correctional setting—including three doctors who had worked at the [Cook County] Jail—
similarly observed that the “crowded congregate housing arrangements” of jails and prisons 
promote the transmission of respiratory illnesses like the coronavirus disease. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 51 See United States v. Guerra Castillo, No. 1:16-cr-00259-JKB-6, 2020 WL 1540508, at 
*1 (D. Md. Mar. 27, 2020) (requesting federal marshals to provide defense counsel with health 
status update and next steps where defendant asserted that his cellmate in the federal jail had 
tested positive for COVID-19). 
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of U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prisoners who are reported to have tested 
positive for SARS-CoV-2 changes every day.52 
At this writing, federal judges are very early in formulating their 
responses to these arguments.  These early judicial approaches provide a 
window into evaluating the various release arguments and their overall 
premise: that COVID-19 has made federal jails so dangerous that defendants 
should not be detained if their own safety or the community’s safety is to be 
protected.  Because the Bail Reform Act directs an individualized assessment 
of the 3142(g) factors, decisions on COVID-19 release motions will depend 
heavily on individual movants’ situations, including their medical conditions, 
personal histories, criminal backgrounds, and charged offenses.  The 
decisions will also turn on the factual content of the government’s opposition, 
which has maintained consistently that adequate measures are being taken to 
prevent the spread of COVID-19 in jails and detention centers, and to which 
we will now turn. 
B. THE GOVERNMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DETENTION 
NOTWITHSTANDING COVID-19 
In early April 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a 
memorandum giving guidance to its prosecutors, urging them to continue to 
exercise their discretion, while considering COVID-19 risks to defendants, 
jails, and the general public within the framework of the Bail Reform Act.53  
The Attorney General directed federal prosecutors to give “controlling 
weight” to public safety: 
We simply cannot agree to anything that will put the public at risk. COVID-19 presents 
real risks, but so does allowing violent gang members and child predators to roam free. 
When you believe a defendant poses a risk to the safety of any person or the community 
at large, you should continue to seek remand as zealously today as you would have 
before the pandemic began, in accordance with the BRA’s plain terms. Protecting the 
public from criminals is our paramount obligation. 
 
 52 As of early May 2020, BOP was reporting that more than 3,000 prisoners had tested 
positive, according to a website that the BOP states it updates every day at 3 p.m. Eastern 
time. See COVID-19 Cases, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/B78G-9UEZ] (last reviewed May 11, 2020). The BOP has said that only ten 
prisoners had tested positive as of March 26, 2020. Statement from BOP Director, FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200326_statem
ent_from_director.jsp [https://perma.cc/7N8Q-TE47]. 
 53 William P. Barr, Memorandum to All Component Department Heads and All United 
States Attorneys, “Litigating Pre-Trial Detention Issues During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 
UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Barr Pre-Trial Detention 
Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/file/1266901/download [https://perma.cc/WAF9-H3
9P]. 
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*** 
At the same time that the defendant’s risk from COVID-19 should be a significant 
factor in your analysis, you should also consider any risk that releasing the defendant 
would pose to the public. This consideration will depend on the facts and circumstances 
of each defendant and the facility where he or she is being held, and you should factor 
this consideration into your analysis as appropriate. Our duty to protect the public 
extends to protecting it from contagion spread by someone released from our custody.54 
Also as of early April 2020, the BOP had already taken a number of 
steps to prevent or stem the spread of COVID-19 within its 122 institutions, 
which house some 146,000 prisoners.  On March 13, 2020, the BOP 
undertook a series of measures including temporary restrictions on visitation, 
restrictions on inmate movement to only required and “mission-essential” 
transfers, increased health screening of staff and inmates, and increased 
sanitary measures.  These measures include screening newly arriving inmates 
for COVID-19 exposure risk factors and symptoms, quarantining 
asymptomatic prisoners with exposure risk factors, and isolating and testing 
symptomatic inmates with exposure risk factors.  These measures do not 
include a comprehensive testing program for asymptomatic prisoners or 
staff.55 
 
 54 Id. at 1–2. The memorandum ended with this instruction: “We must adapt to the current 
difficult circumstances, while also ensuring that we never deviate from our duty to keep the 
public safe from dangerous criminals. Please exercise your discretion appropriately.” Id. at 2. 
 55 The BOP described its preventive measures as of March 13, 2020 as follows, in full: 
SOCIAL VISITS: Social visits will be suspended for 30 days, at which time the suspension will 
be reevaluated. To ensure inmates maintain social ties, the BOP will allow for additional inmate 
telephone communications. Inmates will be allowed 500 (vs. 300) telephone minutes per month. 
LEGAL VISITS: Access to legal counsel remains a paramount requirement in the BOP but like 
social visiting, the BOP is mitigating the risk of exposure created by external visitors. As such, 
while in general, legal visits will be suspended for 30 days, case-by-case accommodation will be 
accomplished at the local level and confidential legal calls will be allowed in order to ensure 
inmates maintain access to counsel. Attorneys seeking an in-person visit with their client or a 
confidential call should contact the institution Executive Assistant (see email address on the 
relevant facility bop.gov page) or contact the appropriate Consolidated Legal Center for the BOP 
institution (see page 54 of the Legal Resource Guide). If approved for an in-person visit, the 
attorney will need to undergo screening using the same procedures as staff. 
INMATE MOVEMENT: All inmate facility transfers will be suspended for 30 days, at which 
time the suspension will be reevaluated. Exceptions are allowed for forensic studies, writs, 
Interstate Agreements on Detainers (IAD), medical or mental health treatment, and release to pre-
release custody. Other case-by-case exceptions (e.g. for judicial proceedings) may be approved by 
BOP Regional Counsel. Admission of new inmates will continue. 
OFFICIAL STAFF TRAVEL: Official staff travel (with the exception of relocation) will be 
suspended for 30 days, at which time the suspension will be reevaluated. Any exceptions may be 
approved by the Deputy Director of the BOP. 
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On March 31, 2020, the BOP announced more measures, including the 
securing of all prisoners in their assigned cells for 14 days, although prisoners 
 
TRAINING: All staff training, with the exception of basic staff training for new employees at the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and the local facility, is suspended for 30 days at which 
time the suspension will be reevaluated. Any exceptions must be approved by the Deputy Director 
of the BOP. 
STAFF HIRING: Staff hiring initiatives will continue. 
CONTRACTORS: Contractor access to BOP facilities will be restricted for 30 days to only those 
performing essential services (e.g. medical or mental health care, religious, etc.) or those who 
perform necessary maintenance on essential systems. Contractors who require access will be 
screened using the same procedures as staff prior to entry. 
VOLUNTEERS: Volunteer visits will be suspended for 30 days, at which time the suspension 
will be reevaluated. Exceptions will be approved by the Deputy Director of the BOP. Alternate 
means of communication (e.g. telephone calls) will be available for inmates who request to speak 
privately with a religious advisor. Volunteers who are approved for access will be screened using 
the same procedures as staff prior to entry. 
SCREENING OF STAFF: Enhanced health screening of staff will be implemented in areas with 
“sustained community transmission” and at medical referral centers. Sustained community 
transmission is determined by the CDC and will be indicated on the map on this resource page 
where state community transmission indicates “Yes.” Such screening includes self-reporting and 
temperature checks for the next 30 days, at which time the process will be reevaluated. 
SCREENING OF INMATES: The BOP manages an infectious disease management program as 
a matter of routine. To address the specific issues involving COVID-19, the BOP uses the 
following practices: 
• All newly-arriving BOP inmates are being screened for COVID-19 exposure risk 
factors and symptoms. 
• Asymptomatic inmates with exposure risk factors are quarantined. 
• Symptomatic inmates with exposure risk factors are isolated and tested for COVID-19 
per local health authority protocols. 
TOURS: Tours will be suspended for 30 days, at which time the suspension will be reevaluated. 
Any exceptions will be approved by the Deputy Director of the BOP. If approved, participants 
will be screened using the same procedures as staff prior to entry. 
MODIFIED OPERATIONS: For the next 30 days, the BOP will implement nationwide 
modified operations to maximize social distancing and limit group gatherings in our facilities. For 
example, depending on the facility’s population and physical layout, the institution may 
implement staggered meal times, recreation, etc. These modifications will be reevaluated in 30 
days. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons COVID-19 Action Plan, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://
www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200313_covid-19.jsp [https://perma.cc/VBQ3-GWTU] (last 
updated Mar. 13, 2020); Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Bureau of Prisons Update on 
COVID-19 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/20200324_bop_pr
ess_release_covid19_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/WYK4-L7US] (describing measures 
announced March 13).  On April 24, 2020, the BOP announced that it was expanding COVID-
19 testing among asymptomatic prisoners, acknowledging that “asymptomatic or pre-
symptomatic inmates can be positive for COVID-19 and can transmit the virus to other 
inmates. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Bureau of Prisons Expands COVID-19 
Testing (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20200424_expanded_testing.
jsp [https://perma.cc/5A93-NR52]. 
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would still have access to normal programs and services such as mental 
health treatment and education.56 
These measures, along with any additional steps the BOP may announce 
after this writing, can be expected to form the core of a governmental proffer 
that measures are being taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 within a 
federal jail, possibly supplemented by whatever additional individual details 
prosecutors might present to argue that the local jail is not an unsafe place.57  
Courts, in the context of suits by state pretrial detainees challenging their 
 
 56 The BOP described its “Phase 5” measures, effective April 1, 2020, as follows in full: 
• For a 14-day period, inmates in every institution will be secured in their assigned 
cells/quarters to decrease the spread of the virus. This modification to our action plan 
is based on health concerns, not disruptive inmate behavior. 
• During this time, to the extent practicable, inmates should still have access to programs 
and services that are offered under normal operating procedures, such as mental health 
treatment and education. 
• In addition, the Bureau is coordinating with the United States Marshals Service 
(USMS) to significantly decrease incoming movement during this time. 
• After 14 days, this decision will be reevaluated and a decision made as to whether or 
not to return to modified operations. 
• Limited group gathering will be afforded to the extent practical to facilitate 
commissary, laundry, showers, telephone, and Trust Fund Limited Inmate Computer 
System (TRULINCS) access. 
COVID-19 Action Plan: Phase Five FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS https://www.bop.
gov/resources/news/20200331_covid19_action_plan_5.jsp [https://perma.cc/VBQ3-GWTU] 
(updated Mar. 31, 2020). Phase 6 of the BOP Action Plan extended Phase 5 to May 18, 2020. 
Bureau of Prisons COVID-19 Action Plan: Phase Six (Apr. 14, 2020), https://www.bop.gov/
resources/news/pdfs/20200414_press_release_action_plan_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC2P-
A6P8]. 
 57 For example, federal prosecutors in Maryland listed a similar set of measures 
implemented by the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, which 
houses federal prisoners at the Chesapeake Detention Facility (CDF), but added that: 
• attorney visits were being done from the other side of a glass wall, with use of a 
telephone; 
• few federal detainees were entering the CDF “at this time”; 
• each detainee possesses his own supply of soap to wash hands “at any time throughout 
the day”; 
• hand sanitizer has been “posted throughout the facility”; and 
• a group of CDF detainees has been trained and tasked with “disinfect[ing] and 
clean[ing] all surfaces that could be touched” on a full-time basis. 
See Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Appeal of Detention Order at 9–11, United States 
v. Martin, No. 1:19-cr-00140-PWG (D. Md. Mar. 16, 2020) [hereinafter Government 
Opposition in Martin]. The court accepted the government’s proffer and denied the 
defendant’s appeal of a detention order in that case, but with no further comment on the merits 
or extensiveness of the proffer. United States v. Martin, No. PWG-19-140-13, 2020 WL 
1274857, at *4 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2020). 
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confinement in infection-ravaged county jails, also are providing some 
guidance as to possible minimum constitutional standards for protecting 
pretrial detainees from infection by the virus.58 
In addition, prosecutors can be expected to advance, or have advanced, 
some of the following arguments that speak to issues other than the 
conditions inside the jail: 
 
 58 In Mays v. Dart, No. 20 C 2134, 2020 WL 1897007 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2020), the court 
converted its April 9, 2020 temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction, in the 
class action arguing that conditions for pre-trial detainees violated constitutional due process 
because they were objectively unreasonable. The court ordered a sheriff, who operates the 
Cook County Jail, to: 
(1) require prompt coronavirus testing of symptomatic detainees and, “at medically appropriate 
times,” of detainees exposed to symptomatic persons or persons who have tested positive, while 
acquiring enough testing supplies so that the testing decision is made based on medical criteria 
and not the availability of the supplies; 
(2) enforce social distancing during the jail intake process, including continued suspension of the 
use of “bullpens” to hold groups of newly arriving prisoners; 
(3) provide soap and/or hand sanitizer to all detainees in quantities sufficient to permit them to 
frequently clean their hands; 
(4) provide sanitation supplies sufficient and adequate to enable all staff and detainees to regularly 
sanitize surfaces and objects on which the virus could be present, including in all areas occupied 
or frequented by more than one person (such as two-person cells, as well as bathrooms, showers, 
and other surfaces in common areas); 
(5) require sanitization between all uses of frequently touched surfaces and objects as well as 
monitoring and supervision to ensure that such sanitization takes place regularly; 
(6) provide facemasks to all detained persons who are quarantined—i.e., those who have been 
exposed to a detained person who is symptomatic (even if not coronavirus-positive), replacing 
them at medically appropriate intervals, and providing users with instruction on how to use a 
facemask and the reasons for its use; 
(7) establishing a policy precluding group housing or double celling of detained persons with a set 
of delineated exceptions; and 
(8) providing face masks, to be replaced at “medically appropriate” intervals, for detainees housed 
under the exceptions to (7) above, along with instruction on how to use a facemask, the reasons 
for its use, and the importance of social distancing. 
Id. at *36–37; see also Swain v. Junior, No. 1:20-cv-21457-KMW, 2020 WL 2078580, at *21–
22 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2020) (entering forty-five-day preliminary injunction ordering, among 
other measures, enforcement of six-foot interpersonal space “to the maximum extent possible” 
and provision, to prisoners, of adequate supplies of soap, disinfectant products, and toilet 
paper), called into question, No. 20-11622-C, 2020 WL 2161317, at *4–7 (11th Cir. May 5, 
2020) (staying preliminary injunction pending appeal). Rulings like the order in Mays, coming 
on a motion for injunctive relief dependent on a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, 
and relating to a jail facility reported to be one of the largest known single source of COVID-
19 infections in the nation, see Mays, 2020 WL 1987007, at *4, may set forth a guidepost for 
minimum constitutional standards that a court might expect for detention of pre-trial detainees 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, at least in jurisdictions that do not require detainees to make 
the nearly impossible showing of deliberate indifference in these cases. 
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(1) Section 3142(g) factors favor detention. 
The application of the Section 3142(g) factors, before consideration 
of COVID-19, weigh heavily in favor of detention and thus 
outweigh the concerns a defendant might raise with respect to 
COVID-19, however valid those concerns may be.59 
(2) Release will burden pretrial services staff or endanger a third-party 
custodian. 
Release into home confinement under electronic monitoring will 
put pretrial services staff members at risk because location 
monitoring “would require some interaction that is not consistent 
with personal distancing”60 and will risk overburdening pretrial 
services staff where resources are already stretched thin.61 Or, in 
some cases, temporary release to a third-party custodian under 
Section 3142(i) might put the custodian at risk, particularly if 
defendant’s background includes a history of domestic violence.62 
(3) Releasing detainees will open the “floodgates.” 
Granting various COVID-19 motions, or accepting defense 
arguments for release based on the risk of COVID-19 infection 
within jails, will cause courts to be “flooded” with bids for release 
by prisoners who are making little more than a “generic” argument 
that they should be released for their own safety or to avert a 
“speculative” outbreak at the jail.63 This could lead to the release 
of “all” federal prisoners because they are subject to the same risk 
of COVID-19 infection. This argument should not be dismissed as 
extreme; some courts already have accepted it.64 
 
 59 Government Opposition in Martin, supra note 57, at 3–8; see also United States v. 
Lunnie, No. 4:19-cr-00180 KGB, 2020 WL 1644495, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 2, 2020) (denying 
COVID-19 motion for temporary release under Section 3142(i) of “high-risk defendant” for 
whom “[t]he need for detention is not even a close call”). 
 60 See United States v. Sanders, No. 19-20037-01-DDC, 2020 WL 1528621, at *5 (D. 
Kan. Mar. 31, 2020) (citing Martin, 2020 WL 1274857, at *4); United States v. Clark, No. 19-
40068-01-HLT, 2020 WL 1446895, at *7 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2020). 
 61 See Government’s Opposition in Martin, supra note 57, at 13. Prosecutors also might 
make a “floodgates” argument that releasing even one defendant temporarily into home 
incarceration with location monitoring would lead to many more such release arrangements 
that would overwhelm the courts’ pre-trial services staff. Government’s Response to 
Defendant’s Motion for Release at 19, United States v. Woodman, No. 20 CV 1792 (N.D. Ill. 
2020) [hereinafter Government’s Opposition in Woodman]. 
 62 Id. at 11. 
 63 Government’s Opposition in Martin, supra note 57, at 13–14. 
 64 United States v. Kerr, No. 3:19-cr-296-L, 2020 WL 1529180, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 
2020). The Kerr court stated: “Any detainee would be exposed to the same risk that Defendant 
presents, and, as other courts have also concluded, the court cannot not release every detainee 
who may be at risk of contracting COVID-19, as it would then be required to release all 
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(4) Prisoners’ risk of infection is too generalized to justify release. 
Where there is no infection reported in the jail in question, 
prosecutors may argue that prisoners’ risk of infection is too 
generalized and speculative to be credited as a sufficient reason to 
shift the balancing of the Section 3142(g) factors in favor of 
temporary release under Section 3142(i).65 One problem with this 
argument is that it has greater resonance when there are no reported 
infections in a jail. However, the number of reported infections has 
been changing daily.66 Even where a jail has begun to see prisoners 
testing positive, prosecutors have argued that the BOP’s series of 
protective measures and the closed nature of jails themselves means 
that the jail “remains a safe place for defendants to be housed.”67 
(5) Prisoners may be safer in prison. 
A prisoner moving for release under COVID-19 should be 
required, some prosecutors may argue, to show that the conditions 
of his release (including his home environment, his plans for 
getting there from the jail upon release, and his plan for obtaining 
health care if he were to be infected with COVID-19 while on 
release) would keep him safer than jail, where “he has access to 
around-the-clock medical care, the facility is staffed and trained to 
contain or treat the virus if necessary, and it collaborates with 
government partners and health agencies to keep its employees and 
those in its care safe and healthy.”68 Or, prosecutors may argue that 
if there is no reported infection inside the jail, a defendant is safer 
 
detainees.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing United Stated v. Fitzgerald, No. 2:17-cr-00295-
JCM-NJK, 2020 WL 1433932, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 24, 2020)) (“Defendant’s argument applies 
equally to every detainee in detention; however, the Court cannot release every detainee at 
risk of contracting COVID-19 because the Court would then be obligated to release every 
detainee.”). 
 65 Clark, 2020 WL 1446895, at *5–6; Government’s Opposition in Woodman, supra note 
61, at 12–13. 
 66 Compare United States v. Hamilton, No. 19-CR-54-01 (NGG), 2020 WL 1323036, at 
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2020) (denying COVID-19 release motion, noting that “perhaps most 
importantly, as of this writing, there have been no reported incidents of COVID-19 within [the 
Brooklyn] MDC, and the Bureau of Prisons is taking system-wide precautions to mitigate the 
possibility of infection within its facilities”), with COVID-19 Cases, supra note 52 (disclosing, 
on same day as decision in Hamilton, that a prisoner at the Brooklyn MDC had tested positive). 
 67 Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Release at 11, United States v. 
Flores, No. 17 CR 822-1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 15, 2020) [hereinafter Government’s Opposition in 
Flores]. 
 68 The court so held in Clark, citing to published information about responses to COVID-
19 implemented at the federal jail in Leavenworth, Kansas. 2020 WL 1446895, at *6. 
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there than in a community where COVID-19 is continuing to 
spread.69 
The government will likely make many other arguments against release.  
Some might be specific to each case, while others may delve into greater 
detail regarding what is known about the pandemic and the particular risks it 
poses inside jails.  Greater facts and data on all of those points ought to be 
welcomed by courts as they analyze the validity of COVID-19 release 
motions. 
C. WHERE THE “WILD FACTS” ARE 
In resolving the numerous motions for release from federal custody 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, judges will take different approaches.  In 
some cases, judges may use what Judge Posner called “formalism,” which he 
defined as “the use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from 
premises accepted as authoritative” in order to reach a “correct” result.70  
This approach might be appropriate in some cases.  For example, in a case 
like United States v. Lunnie, the court determined that the evidence showed 
the defendant was so dangerous that the motion required little additional 
consideration beyond what already was done at the initial detention 
hearing.71  A paradigmatic example to think about is that of mass murderer 
Charles Manson.  If Charles Manson were detained on federal charges, and 
he filed a motion to re-open his bail hearing or for temporary release under 
Section 3142(i) due to the COVID-19 outbreak and its threat to the jail 
population, few judges, if any, would find that the interest in his safety and 
the community’s safety from the risk of a COVID-19 infection overrode the 
public safety interest in his remaining behind bars. 
But Lunnie and our Charles Manson hypothetical are the easy cases.  In 
other cases, COVID-19 introduces much more complexity into the decision-
making process.  Consider, for example, non-violent elderly detainees with 
compromised respiratory systems who now seek release to a suitable third-
party custodian.  If there are no reported infections inside their particular jail 
 
 69 See Government’s Opposition in Woodman, supra note 61, at 16 (“Defendant 
erroneously presumes that his risk of contracting COVID-19 is greater in custody than out; 
but currently defendant is in a detention facility where no known instances of the virus are 
present, where social contact with the outside world is suspended, and apparently where 
entrants (staff and inmates) to the facility are screened and measures to isolate high-risk 
individuals are in progress, compared to the general public in Illinois, where the risk of 
contracting the virus is arguably higher.”). 
 70 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181 (1987). 
 71 United States v. Lunnie, No. 4:19-cr-00180 KGB, 2020 WL 1644495, at *2 (E.D. Ark. 
Apr. 2, 2020). 
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facility, is their risk of getting ill too “speculative” or “generalized” despite 
their personal circumstances?  If these prisoners’ risk is generalized but 
cognizable enough to be considered, what must they show: that they will 
inevitably fall ill of COVID-19 in the jail?  Or that the odds—however we 
might determine them, if we even could—are somehow too great to permit 
their incarceration? 
The formalist approach applied in cases like United States v. Kerr, in 
which the court reasoned that one order releasing a detainee based on 
COVID-19 would require releasing all detainees (presumably even the 
Charles Mansons), risks bypassing the complexity of the individual facts of 
a case.72  Other formalist approaches, such as adhering to precedents to deny 
or grant release in view of COVID-19, without delving into the factual and 
scientific basis for what makes one precedent more compelling than another, 
also may miss the complexity that COVID-19 motions for release present.  
In this unique, unprecedented time, courts should try to avoid retreating into 
mechanisms that take them directly to a result without confronting the 
shortcomings of those mechanisms or addressing broader questions such as 
what the “safety of any other person or the community” actually means or 
should mean under the Bail Reform Act.  According to Posner: 
At the root of the refusal of many judges to confront, even to recognize, the challenge 
of complexity is a professional mind-set that often includes—along with impartiality, 
conscientiousness, and other traditional attributes of a good judge — lack of curiosity, 
a feeling of intimidation by science and technology, and a lack of interest in obtaining 
an empirical rather than merely intuitive grounding for one’s beliefs.73 
Consider Jerome Frank’s description of Judges Learned Hand and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, who also emphasized the importance of engaging 
with the particular facts of each case—even when they do not fall neatly into 
any particular model or system: 
Like Holmes, [Hand] delights in contriving generalizations while recognizing their 
pernicious character if not constantly in gear with particulars. Or, to paraphrase Kant, 
he knows that generalizations without particulars are empty and particulars without 
generalizations are blind. Both men have been sceptical [sic] of neat, closed, systems; 
like William James, they have sought the “‘wild facts” that escape any system.74 
Posner distinguished the early to mid-twentieth-century “legal realism” 
movement, of which Frank was a noted leader, from Posner’s own brand of 
 
 72 See United States v. Kerr, No. 19-cr-296-L, 2020 WL 1529180 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 
2020). 
 73 POSNER, supra note 3, at 92. 
 74 Jerome N. Frank, Some Reflections on Judge Learned Hand, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 
669 (1956–57); see generally Jerome Frank, Some Tame Reflections on Some Wild Facts, in 
VISION AND ACTION 56 (Sidney Ratner ed., 1953). 
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realism, which he called “deeply skeptical of formalism, regarding it as more 
rhetoric than analysis—a rhetoric that conceals the actual springs of 
decision.”75  While both types of realism emphasize “the consequences of 
judicial rulings,” Posner describes his realism as finding its origins in 
pragmatism and science, the affinity between the two, and “an openness to 
facts”: 
The core of a defensible legal realism is the idea that in many cases, and those the most 
important, the judge will have to settle for a reasonable, a sensible, result, rather than 
being able to come up with a result that is demonstrably, irrefutably, “logically” correct. 
Law is not logic but experience, as Holmes famously put it. And experience is the 
domain of fact, and so the realist has a much greater interest in fact than the formalist, 
and in “fact” in a richer sense than what a judge can glean from a trial transcript. And 
today that richer sense encompasses the findings of science, along with statistical and 
other systemic data. But science and data will no more resolve every case than orthodox 
legal texts will. What is reasonable or sensible will often depend on moral feelings, 
common sense, sympathies, and other ingredients of thought and feeling that can’t 
readily be translated into a weighing of measurable consequences. But openness to facts 
not limited to those found in judicial records is what I want to stress.76 
Posner’s intimation that judges’ experiences and well of “common 
sense” must somehow be a part of their journey to a result relates to the 
abstract concept of “wild facts,” as that term was used by legal realists and 
by James before them. Wild facts have been described as “those which 
furnish so much of the spirited element in our existence and which our logical 
propositions and scientific laws simply fail to net. It takes a more alert and 
compassionate nature than most men possess to sense the presence of ‘wild 
facts’ and respect their worth and influence.”77 
As for what may be done with “wild facts,” Frank offered a theory he 
called “fact-skepticism” in an effort to describe or predict how judges decide 
cases: when assertions purporting to be facts are in conflict, one or more of 
those assertions must be wrong.  To find which is wrong, judges exercise 
“fact discretion” to determine which are more reliable, based largely on an 
individual judge’s unique reaction to the conflicting evidence.78  One might 
think of “fact discretion” as a lofty way of describing the ball-and-strike calls 
judges commonly make amid conflicting facts.  To make these calls, judges 
need to have the facts before them, including the “wild” ones. 
However, the fact of the matter is that more than 100 years after the 
writings of William James, scholars have not easily explained what he meant 
by the term “wild facts,” or how we might find and apply them.  Some have 
 
 75 POSNER, supra note 3, at 5. 
 76 Id. at 6. 
 77 Cahn, supra note 2, at 827. 
 78 Id. at 825. 
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interpreted James as seeking to sort through a “quasi-chaotic” or 
“primordial” world of “concrete particulars” with a pragmatism borne of 
“pure” or “raw” experience.79  Others have interpreted James’s form of 
pragmatism as requiring judges to “base their decisions on a subjective sense 
of certainty or a sentiment of rationality” and “verify [their decisions] by their 
consequences.”80 
In other words, judges should expose their minds to the full complexity of their cases 
and use their intuition or imagination to determine just decisions. As long as judges 
honor the pragmatic conditions which discipline hunches, this method of judicial 
decision making has the potential of improving the administration of justice despite the 
explosion of fact and the indeterminacy of law.81 
Formulations like these begin to take the abstraction of “wild facts” well 
into the realm of the obvious.  “Pragmatists” and “realists” may be judges 
who simply have the willingness and the energy to delve deeply into facts, 
internal and external to their cases, so that their decisions may account for 
the “full complexity” of those cases.  That is not far from Posner’s urging, 
under his conception of “pragmatism” or “realism,” that judges maintain “an 
openness to facts not limited to those found in judicial records.”  Posner has 
been described as “most often taken to represent legal pragmatism today,” 
but his forays into describing a pragmatic philosophy as an everyday 
“practice” for judges have been criticized as “leav[ing] one unsure not only 
who he thinks the pragmatist philosophers were and what he takes them to 
have said, but also whether he’s really only concerned, as he claims, with 
everyday rather than philosophical pragmatism.”82 
Whether or not that criticism is fair, Posner also offered a helpful 
analogy to battlefield communications in a time of war: if facially clear 
 
 79 Douglas Lind, The Mismeasurement of Legal Pragmatism, 4 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 213, 
226–28 (2012); Douglas Lind, Pragmatism and Anthropomorphism: Reconceiving the 
Doctrine of the Personality of the Ship, 22 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 39, 77–78 (2010). 
 80 Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 55, 88–89 (2001). 
 81 Id. 
 82 See Susan Haack, The Pragmatist Tradition: Lessons for Legal Theorists, 95 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1049, 1069–71 (2018) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (2003)). Haack suggests that Posner’s discussion of philosophical approaches to 
the law “ties his audience in knots.” Id. at 1070. Posner’s characterizations of formalism and 
realism have, at the very least, evolved. In 1986, he compared formalism to following a 
mathematical calculation whose result could then be called correct or incorrect, and he 
described realism as a form of “policy analysis” that “decid[es] [a] case so that its outcome 
best promotes public welfare in nonlegalistic terms.” Posner, supra note 70, at 181. Posner 
then postulated that as he had defined them, neither formalism nor realism applies to statutory 
interpretation. Id. at 187. In 2013, he appeared to advocate for a form of “realism” that more 
fully accounted for facts. POSNER, supra note 3, at 92. 
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statutory language does not give judges adequate direction amid the 
complexities and unexpected obstacles of the battlefield, or becomes garbled 
on that battlefield, judges must interpret the statute as they would a battlefield 
communication.83  They must seek to accomplish the statute’s objective, 
through their own interpretation of the statute’s language, even if that 
language is garbled, incomplete, or inadequate for the complexity of the 
case.84 
Rather than resolve the academic debate about what pragmatism means 
or who may have characterized it best, it is sufficient for our purposes to take 
Posner at his word when he proposes a sharper focus on facts and science as 
a means of navigating complexity or applying statutes to unexpected, fluid 
situations like the one presented by COVID-19.  And, for our purposes, we 
define “wild facts” as those that might require effort to discover through such 
a sharpened focus on facts and science, and which, in our experience, should 
make a difference in decisions under the Bail Reform Act during this time of 
pandemic. 
Committing to hunt for the “wild facts” means recognizing that answers 
are not likely to be found easily through a rigid application of the Bail Reform 
Act.  At first blush, Section 3142(g)’s fourth factor concerning the impact of 
a person’s release upon the safety of the community might seem less material 
where a defendant is not a danger to the community and is sought to be 
detained only as a flight risk.85  Courts will need to consider whether the 
fourth (g) factor truly is immaterial in that context, if detaining someone as a 
flight risk truly could have an incremental negative impact on public safety 
during COVID-19.86 
 
 83 Posner, supra note 70, at 190–91. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See United States v. Yu Zhou and Li Chen, No. 19-CR-163, 2020 WL 1643634 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 2, 2020). In Zhou, the court called the COVID-19 concerns raised by the 
defendants―not detained as dangers to the community―immaterial for purposes of their 
motions to re-open their bail hearings. Id. at *3–4, 7. The emergence of COVID-19 “plays no 
material role in as to whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the 
future appearance” of the defendants in the wire fraud and trade secrets theft case in which the 
defendants had deep ties to China. Id. at *3. The government did not contend that either 
defendant was a danger to the community, a fact that persuaded the court that the community’s 
safety was simply not at issue in the motions to re-open bail. Id. at *4, 8. 
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. ELH-20-09, 2020 WL 1529158, at *4 (D. Md. 
Mar. 30. 2020) (agreeing with letter from public health experts asserting that “reducing the 
number of detained persons in Maryland will make the community safer”); cf. United States 
v. Cox, No. 19-cr-271, 2020 WL 1491180, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 27, 2020) (“[A]n individual 
citing ‘compelling reasons’ based on the threat of COVID-19 who is charged with a non-
violent offense and who was previously detained as a flight risk may fare better in this analysis 
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A formalistic view of the Bail Reform Act, one that does not account 
for the facts and subtleties that COVID-19 release arguments may present, 
becomes a sort of “snipe hunt”—the apocryphal children’s summer camp 
prank where unwitting youths sit in the middle of a field holding open a bag, 
into which, they are told, the wild “snipe” birds will trap themselves, usually 
sometime between midnight and 1 a.m.  While there is every reason to 
believe that wild facts exist, they will not be found by sitting and waiting for 
the parties to shoo them into the judge’s open bag.  Judges may well have to 
wander into the forest to locate them, much as they might independently 
search for cases or other authorities that the parties have not called to their 
attention. 
D. APPLYING “WILD FACTS” TO FEDERAL DETENTION IN THE 
PANDEMIC 
Now that we have attempted to bring the concept of “wild facts” to 
earth, we can undertake the task of scrutinizing them more closely and 
applying them.  Federal detention decisions always have turned on specific 
facts.  COVID-19 does not change that truism, but the complexity the 
pandemic adds to the detention calculus challenges judges to look even 
harder for facts that make a difference.  One of the factual issues arising again 
and again in the early judicial decisions on bail and COVID-19 is the number 
of infections reportedly existing in a jail.  An emerging body of reports and 
research suggests that courts ought to give this brand of factual representation 
a close look. 
Academic studies appear to contain growing evidence that 
asymptomatic persons (who are not currently being tested or isolated under 
the BOP action plan) may already be infected with COVID-19 and are 
already capable of spreading it.87  And aside from the academic studies, news 
 
than the individual charged with a violent offense who has been found to be both a danger to 
the community and a flight risk.”). 
 87 As one group of researchers recently wrote: 
Asymptomatic transmission of COVID-19 has been documented. The viral loads of asymptomatic 
carriers are similar to those in symptomatic carriers. A recent study concluded that asymptomatic 
and symptomatic carriers may have the same level of infectiousness. These findings demand a 
reassessment of the transmission dynamics of the COVID-19 outbreak that better account for 
asymptomatic transmission. 
Jacob B. Aguilar, et al., Investigating the Impact of Asymptomatic Carriers on COVID-19 
Transmission, CORONAVIRUS COVID-19 PUBLICATIONS BY UMMS AUTHORS (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://escholarship.umassmed.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1005&context=covid19 [http
s://perma.cc/3E66-PY8S] (citations omitted); see also Frank Diamond, Asymptomatic 
Carriers of COVID-19 Make It Tough To Target, 24 INFECTION CONTROL TODAY (Mar. 17, 
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articles have suggested that measures aimed at curbing the spread of 
coronavirus by focusing only on symptomatic persons are failing to account 
for the ability of asymptomatic persons to spread the disease.88  Some 
researchers are suggesting that “pre-symptomatic” persons may be 
particularly prone to spreading the disease in the two to three days before 
they begin to show symptoms.89  For its part, the CDC itself has stated 
publicly that “[s]ome people without symptoms may be able to spread the 
virus,” while the Bureau of Prisons acknowledges that asymptomatic persons 
may transmit the disease.90  Asymptomatic persons may have no idea that 
they are infected or that they can spread the virus, and some researchers are 
proposing wider, more aggressive testing of the asymptomatic as a means of 
identifying contagious persons.91  These studies and reports suggest that the 
key question may turn on more than the mere number of prisoners confirmed 
to have tested positive for COVID-19 in a jail.  The question of how prevalent 
the virus may be in a jail, and of the extent of infection risk to individual 
detainees or to the jail population and the community as a result of their 
 
2020), https://www.infectioncontroltoday.com/covid-19/asymptomatic-carriers-covid-19-ma
ke-it-tough-target [https://perma.cc/5EA8-H7YL] (referencing Japanese study showing that 
of the 634 Diamond Princess cruise ship passengers who tested positive for the novel 
coronavirus, 17.9 % were asymptomatic). 
 88 See Mike Stobbe, More Evidence Emerges that Coronavirus Infections Can [be] 
Spread by People with No Clear Symptoms, CANADIAN BROADCASTING CO. (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.cbc.ca/news/health/covid-19-singapore-symptoms-1.5518772 [https://perma.cc/
UEE9-MG5A] (discussing recent China-based study estimating that about 10% of new 
COVID-19 infections may be spread by asymptomatic persons). In the town of Mount Vernon, 
Washington, where no stay-at-home order had issued as of early March 2020, a group of about 
sixty church choir members gathered for a rehearsal where the participants, wary of the virus, 
were offered hand sanitizer at the door and avoided hugs and handshakes, and no one showed 
symptoms—but by the end of March, forty-five of them had been diagnosed with COVID-19 
and two had died of it. Richard Reed, A Choir Decided to Go Ahead with Rehearsal. Now 
Dozens of Members Have COVID-19 and Two are Dead, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2020), https://
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-03-29/coronavirus-choir-outbreak) [https://perm
a.cc/WMC5-Z3MJ]. “The outbreak has stunned county health officials, who have concluded 
that the virus was almost certainly transmitted through the air from one or more people without 
symptoms.” Id. 
 89 Melissa Healy, Everyone Infected with the Coronavirus is a Silent Spreader for At Least 
a While, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2020-04-16/eve
ryone-with-the-coronavirus-is-silent-spreader [https://perma.cc/WA87-556E]. 
 90 See How COVID-19 Spreads, supra note 11; Bureau of Prisons Expands COVID-19 
Testing, supra note 55. 
 91 Shan Soe-Lin & Robert Hecht, Most Americans Who Carry the Coronavirus Don’t 
Know It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/26/opinion/
coronavirus-test-asymptomatic.html [https://perma.cc/W4DN-333A] (describing proposal by 
Yale University public health experts to test asymptomatic persons in high-risk groups for 
COVID-19 as often as every five days to “aggressively search for asymptomatic carriers”). 
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detention, might turn also on the etiology of the number of confirmed 
infections, considered in the context of what we know about how COVID-19 
spreads.  
Wild facts about the known spread of COVID-19 within a jail facility 
could help courts determine the weight to be attached to the facility’s 
compliance with CDC guidelines.  Courts already have been asked to hold 
that jail administrators’ adherence to CDC guidelines should be enough to 
meet minimum constitutional standards for housing pre-trial detainees during 
the pandemic, or, alternatively, that the CDC guidelines are “not a surrogate 
for constitutional due process requirements.”92  Undoubtably, CDC 
guidelines at least provide an important benchmark, even if adherence to 
them, without more, is not determinative.93  Yet judges at the detention or 
bail hearing phase are not being asked to order jail officials to comply with a 
minimum constitutional standard.  On the question of pre-trial detention, 
judges instead are evaluating the facts presented to them as they apply the 
Section 3142(g) factors.  If the proffered facts include: (1) there is a specific 
number of prisoners confirmed as having tested positive for COVID-19 at a 
jail, and (2) per CDC guidelines, only symptomatic prisoners are being 
tested, or only a very limited number of asymptomatic prisoners are being 
tested; judges will need to evaluate what the confirmed number of infections 
says about existing risk at the jail and the risk of added incarceration there.  
The CDC guidelines for jails and prisons call for evaluation and testing of 
symptomatic persons and contain no regime for comprehensive testing of the 
asymptomatic.94  When a state prison at Marion, Ohio, mass tested its 
prisoners for COVID-19, 80% tested positive, and 95% of those who tested 
positive had been asymptomatic; results were reported to be similar among 
prisoners mass tested in Arkansas, North Carolina, and Virginia.95  When the 
 
 92 Mays v. Dart, No. 20 C 2134, 2020 WL 1812381, at *26 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2020). 
 93 See id. at *25–26 (viewing jail officials’ adherence to CDC guidelines as insufficient, 
standing alone to establish the constitutionality of conditions, while considering such 
adherence as an important factor in determining whether the conditions are objectively 
reasonable, particularly given that constitutional due process does not require “foolproof 
protection from infection,” quoting Eighth Amendment analysis in Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 
262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 94 Interim Guidance on Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in 
Correctional and Detention Facilities, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) (last reviewed Apr. 29, 2020) https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidance-correctional-detention.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/GZH8-PUWG]. 
 95 Linda So & Grant Smith, In Four U.S. State Prisons, Nearly 3,300 Inmates Test Positive 
for Coronavirus – 96% Without Symptoms, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2020), https://www.reuters.co
m/article/us-health-coronavirus-prisons-testing-in/in-four-u-s-state-prisons-nearly-3300-inm
 
470 FUENTES [Vol. 110 
asymptomatic are not being tested, then, the fact may be that a number of 
prisoners in a jail are “confirmed” to have tested positive for COVID-19, but 
the wild fact lying behind it may be that the true number of infected persons 
inside that jail is simply not known.  And if adherence to CDC guidelines 
contributes to a lack of knowledge about how many persons in a jail are 
infected, perhaps a jail’s adherence to those guidelines ought to be accorded 
less weight in the detention calculus.  In any case, judges at least can ask hard 
questions about the parties’ representations and the depth of the facts 
underlying them.96  Those questions might address not only a jail’s testing 
procedures but also the procedures for removing prisoners to local hospitals 
and the impact on the number of infected persons the institution is reporting.   
The factual issues may go beyond the number of reported infections in 
a jail.  They may include an institution’s knowledge about where 
“confirmed” infected persons were housed in a facility and the degree of 
exposure they had to others in the jail population before they were removed 
to a hospital. They may include state-imposed restrictions on movement or 
other aspects of daily living outside the jail, to the extent any of those might 
affect danger to the community or risk of flight under the Bail Reform Act.  
At the same time, courts ought to be ready to question broad medical 
pronouncements, such as those asserting that detainees, by virtue of their 
diabetes, lung disease, or heart disease, are at greater risk of contracting 
COVID-19 as opposed to at greater risk of suffering more severely if they 
contract COVID-19.97  Courts may wish to explore the specificity and 
severity of asserted medical vulnerabilities, and how those vulnerabilities 
might particularly subject a detainee to risk from COVID-19.  The medical 




 96 There is a very old expression in the annals of Chicago journalism, attributed to the City 
News Bureau of Chicago, a now-defunct wire service whose reporters prowled the halls of 
city police stations, Chicago’s City Hall, and almost anywhere news could be found in 
Chicago dating to 1890: “If your mother says she loves you, check it out.” Newton N. Minow, 
If Your Mother Says She Loves . . . , CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 19, 2000), http://www.chicagotribune.c
om/news/ct-xpm-2000-11-19-0011190214-story.html [https://perma.cc/3CQL-LM6Y]. 
 97 This point may be generating some confusion. United States v. Clark, No. 19-40068-
01-HLT, 2020 WL 1446895, at *4 (D. Kan. Mar. 25, 2020). But see Letter from Sen. Richard 
Durbin et al., to William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., & Michael Carvajal, Director of Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Letter.%20to%20D
OJ%20and%20BOP%20on%20COVID-19%20and%20FSA%20provisions%20-%20final%
20bipartisan%20text%20with%20signature%20blocks.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHU3-JSCG] 
(“The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has issued guidance including that . . . 
individuals with chronic medical conditions, such as lung disease, heart disease, and diabetes, 
are at a higher risk of contracting COVID-19 and suffering more severe illness and death.”). 
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been persuasive to some courts, but others have not regarded it as a necessary 
condition for release.98  Courts might also want to know more about 
detainees’ individual plans for home incarceration or other forms of release 
and the degree to which those plans make their release safer—for the 
community and those around them—than their continued detention. In 
addition, there is the problem of the infected detainee.  If a detainee or 
arrestee already is infected or positive for COVID-19, releasing such a person 
into the community under conditions might risk harm to others, including a 
third-party custodian or a released person’s family members.  Courts might 
try to learn more about the jail’s capacity to render appropriate medical care 
to infected detainees, whether the jail might be nearing that capacity, and the 
extent to which sick prisoners have been removed to local hospitals, if that 
has occurred.99  Anecdotal evidence of adverse impacts on local hospitals is 
already being reported as the number of confirmed infections in some large 
state-operated jails and prisons swells.100  Ultimately, the question is the very 
same one posed in the Bail Reform Act:  whether there is a set of release 
 
 98 See United States v. Davis, No. ELH-20-09, 2020 WL 1529158, at *4–6 (D. Md. Mar. 
30, 2020); United States v. Ramos, 18-CR-300009-FDS, 2020 WL 1478307, at *1–2 (D. 
Mass. Mar. 26, 2020). 
 99  There is every reason to believe that many judges are considering the number of 
infections in a given jail with a great deal of care.  Judges may deny a COVID-19 release 
motion without prejudice while they monitor closely, on a daily basis, the situation in the jails 
within their districts for any reports of infection, and while they remain aware of the risks that 
infectious diseases may pose within jails.  See United States v. Baldwin, No. 17-CR-00787 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2020) (Dkt. No. 165) (denying without prejudice a COVID-19 bail motion 
pending sentencing of a convicted fraud defendant, under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a), and noting that 
BOP’s “significant” measures to guard against infection in Chicago’s Metropolitan 
Correctional Center, including barring “outside visitors for nearly three weeks, quarantining 
new admissions, and treating anyone with medical conditions” militated against finding that 
defendant could show by clear and convincing evidence that he was not likely to flee or pose 
a danger to other persons). 
 100 Andrew Denney, Number of NYC Inmates with Coronavirus Soars as Jail Population 
Dwindles, N.Y. POST (Mar. 27, 2020), https://nypost.com/2020/03/27/number-of-nyc-in
mates-with-coronavirus-soars-as-jail-population-dwindles/ [https://perma.cc/D4TK-PBDX]; 
Chuck Goudie et al., Illinois Prisoners Sick with COVID-19 “Overwhelm” Joliet Hospital, 
ABC7 CHI. (Mar. 30, 2020), https://abc7chicago.com/coronavirus-illinois-chiciago-cases/606
4085 [https://perma.cc/2TV8-AM4K]; Jan Ransom & Alan Feuer, ‘A Storm Is Coming’: 
Fears of an Inmate Epidemic as the Virus Spreads in the Jails, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/nyregion/nyc-coronavirus-rikers-island.html [https://p
erma.cc/DV7T-G944]; see also Josh McGee, Stateville Prison Outbreak Signals COVID-19 
Threat to Inmates, Surrounding Hospital Systems, CHI. REPORTER (Apr. 3, 2020), https://ww
w.chicagoreporter.com/stateville-prison-outbreak-signals-covid-19-threat-to-inmates-surrou
nding-hospital-systems/?amp [https://perma.cc/Z64H-HJDN] (reporting that Illinois National 
guard medics were dispatched to Stateville prison, that 167 Cook County Jail prisoners were 
then COVID-19-positive, and that emergency room physician at local hospital near Stateville 
described the hospital as “a war zone”). 
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conditions that will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the 
community. 
To augment their understanding of facts on the ground at the jail, courts 
have other options.  They may exercise their discretion under the Bail Reform 
Act to conduct aspects of the detention hearing through live witness 
testimony under oath, rather than by proffer.101  Although the compressed 
time frame of a detention might make appointment of an independent expert 
seem impractical, courts might also consider how or whether expert opinion 
might be procured, as appropriate, to address factual issues about jail 
conditions or jails’ vulnerability to infectious disease.102  They may also 
resort to more generalized literature already available.103  Courts have relied 
on such articles in deciding COVID-19 bail motions, but they have not 
always analyzed how concerns about infections spreading in jails generally 
could be applied specifically to the jails where the defendants were headed.104   
 
 101 United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1396 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 102 See United States v. Michigan, 680 F. Supp. 928, 987 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (appointing 
independent expert to address questions about conditions in Michigan prisons). 
 103 Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1047, 1047 (2007) https://doi.org/10.1086/521910 [https://perma.cc/WS4F-RZ7Y] 
(“[T]he probability of transmission of potentially pathogenic organisms is increased by 
crowding, delays in medical evaluation and treatment, rationed access to soap, water, and 
clean laundry, [and] insufficient infection-control expertise.”). 
 104 See United States v. Stephens, No. 15-cr-95 (AJN), 2020 WL 1295155, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 19, 2020) (citing Bick article for proposition that “[a]lthough there is not yet a known 
outbreak among the jail and prison populations, inmates may be at a heightened risk of 
contracting COVID-19 should an outbreak develop”). Importantly, the court in Stephens 
advanced, as an alternative ground for release before reaching COVID-19, the court’s 
conclusion that evidence of the defendant’s dangerousness had weakened significantly since 
the initial detention hearing. Id. at *1. In United States v. Little, the court relied on the Bick 
article as well as an open letter to government officials from some 800 public health and legal 
experts and advocates, urging that the national COVID-19 response include attention to the 
higher risk of the spread of the infection in jails and prisons. No. S3 20 CR 57. (GBD), 2020 
WL 1439979, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2020). But the court in Little also drew on its own 
knowledge and experience, referring to recent incidents at the Brooklyn federal jail (where 
prisoners were without power and heat for a week during a bitter cold snap in early 2019) and 
the Manhattan federal jail (where a recent incident involving a search for a gun in the jail led 
to breakdowns in sanitation and medical care) for the proposition that the two jails “have 
proven – recently and repeatedly – that they are unable to protect the health and safety of 
defendants in their custody.” Id. at *3. The Little court also cited other potentially helpful 
articles about COVID-19 and its effect on jails. See, e.g., LAURA MARUSCHAK ET AL., MEDICAL 
PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES 2011–12 (2016), 
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBA8-U6Z9] (discussing 
generally the greater medical vulnerabilities of persons in state and federal custody); Nicole 
Wetsman, Prisons and Jails Are Vulnerable to COVID-19 Outbreaks, THE VERGE (Mar. 7, 
2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/7/21167807/coronavirus-prison-jail-health-outbrea
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In United States v. Little, the court expressed these generalized concerns and 
then related them to specific incidents that the judge knew had occurred at 
the applicable jails.105  As Posner has suggested, judges inevitably will draw 
on their own experience and knowledge base in deciding these motions.106 
Perhaps not surprisingly, outside the context of bail, some states have 
taken steps to grant early release to various classes of convicted prisoners to 
avoid larger outbreaks within their prison systems.107  The U.S. Attorney 
General told the BOP in a March 2020 memorandum that “there are some at-
risk inmates who are non-violent and pose minimal likelihood of recidivism 
and who might be safer serving their sentences in home confinement rather 
than in BOP facilities.”108  This policy is premised on the idea that adding 
even one more incarcerated person to a potentially infection-prone jail setting 
adds to the risk to the public’s safety.109  At least one court has explicitly 
 
k-covid-19-flu-soap [https://perma.cc/6X77-XNDL] (“People regularly cycle in and out of 
jails and prisons, people who work in them leave and return daily, and visitors regularly stream 
through. Viruses of all kinds have multiple entry points, and those that enter tend to spread 
fast.”). 
 105 2020 WL 1439979, at *3. 
 106 United States v. Ramos, 18-CR-30009-FDS, 2020 WL 1478307, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 
26, 2020) (granting pretrial release to defendant with asthma and diabetes on grounds 
including jail conditions but also upon the disincentives to his flight and his further criminal 
activity because of the risks of catching COVID-19 from engaging in those activities). The 
notion that COVID-19 shifts the Bail Reform Act’s balancing of factors away from detention 
is a pragmatic approach that recognizes a lesser likelihood of flight or continued criminal 
conduct upon release. See also United States v. Fellela, No. 3:19-cr-79 (JAM), 2020 WL 
1457877, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2020) (finding that travel and commercial restrictions 
brought on by the COVID-19 crisis made flight “enormously more risky and complicated” 
and made it “that much more difficult for any attempted fraud activities to succeed,” 
warranting release pending sentencing under Section 3143(a)). 
 107 See, e.g., In re Request to Commute or Suspend County Jail Sentences, No. 084230 
(N.J. Mar. 22, 2020) (ordering the release of certain county jail prisoners “based on the dangers 
posed by Coronavirus disease 19”). 
 108 Memorandum from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., to Dir. of Bureau of Prisons on 
Prioritization of Home Confinement as Appropriate in Response to COVID-19 Pandemic 
(Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.scribd.com/document/453777104/COVID-19-BOP-Memo-Re-
Home-Confinement-2020-03-26 [https://perma.cc/D6RQ-RF8T] (emphasis added). 
 109 In his memo encouraging federal prosecutors to exercise their discretion to consider 
COVID-19 risks in taking positions about detention or release, Attorney General Barr 
acknowledged that adding even one new prisoner to a jail population involves some level of 
risk: 
Even with the extensive precautions we are currently taking, each time a new person is added to a 
jail, it presents at least some risk to the personnel who operate that facility and to the people 
incarcerated therein. It also presents risk to the individual being remanded into custody—risk that 
is particularly acute for individuals who are vulnerable to a serious infection under the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) Guidelines. We have an obligation to minimize these 
 
474 FUENTES [Vol. 110 
endorsed that theory, although not in the context of pretrial release, stating 
that no one else should be imprisoned “if it can be avoided.”110  The “if it can 
be avoided” pronouncement acknowledges that in some cases, detention 
perhaps cannot be avoided under all the facts, no matter the incremental 
additional risk that detention might impose on the community. 
COVID-19 in the federal bail context puts courts in an unprecedented, 
quickly changing situation.111  As some advocates argue that detaining more 
persons in a jail will “pose[] its own dangers to the community,”112 courts 
can agree or disagree in an individual case, based on a richer factual record.  
In the end, this Article will not claim to have found any “wild facts” on its 
own.  Nor does it claim to know precisely what James meant by that term 
more than 100 years ago.  Instead, our working definition of “wild facts” as 
important ones that require energy and effort to bring to the fore leaves 
individual courts to find them, in their exercise of good judgment based on 
their experience.  Courts will see many, many more motions seeking release 
based on COVID-19, under factual permutations that may change with the 
course of the pandemic and its effect on the federal jail population. 
 
risks to the extent possible while remaining faithful to the BRA’s text and discharging our 
overriding obligation to protect the public. 
Barr Pre-Trial Detention Memorandum, supra note 53, at 2. 
 110 See United States v. Garlock, No. 18-cr-00418-VC-1, 2020 WL 1439980, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 25, 2020) (granting a convicted defendant additional time to report to serve a 
sentence of incarceration and stating that “[b]y now it almost goes without saying that we 
should not be adding to the prison population during the COVID-19 pandemic if it can be 
avoided . . . . The chaos has already begun inside federal prisons—inmates and prison 
employees are starting to test positive for the virus, quarantines are being instituted, visits 
from outsiders have been suspended, and inmate movement is being restricted even more than 
usual”). 
 111 Judicial decisions granting and denying COVID-19 release motions have 
acknowledged the unprecedented nature of the situation. See United States v. Stephens, No. 
15-cr-95 (AJN), 2020 WL 1295155, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2020) (referring to “the 
unprecedented and extraordinarily dangerous nature of the COVID-19 pandemic”); United 
States v. Martin, No. PWG-19-140-13, 2020 WL 1274857, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 2020) (“[I]t 
is important to recognize the unprecedented magnitude of the COVID-19 pandemic.”); see 
also supra note 66 (noting how denial of bail by the court in Hamilton, based on the absence 
of positive-tested prisoners at Brooklyn MDC, occurred on the same day the BOP disclosed 
that a prisoner had tested positive there). 
 112 Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Commentary: Don’t Let Chicago’s Federal Jail 
Become the Next Coronavirus Hot Spot, CHI. TRIB.  (Apr. 24, 2020), http://www.chicagotribu
ne.com/opinion/commentary/ct-opinion-coronavirus-jail-cook-county-mcc-20200424-zagv2
nvjyzcrvknxbfasusx63a-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q4HX-P6TX]. 
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CONCLUSION 
Detention motions, and motions for release based on COVID-19, will 
always turn on their individual facts, under an individual assessment of the 
relevant factors under the Bail Reform Act.113  Judges will always have the 
benefit of the Act’s formalistic structure.  But the variance of those facts from 
case to case, the existence of “wild facts” yet to be discovered, and the “fact 
skepticism” that Frank suggests all judges bring with them call for more than 
formalist logic.  During this unprecedented time, judges can be pragmatic 
realists deeply conscious of their obligations under the Act and the 
Constitution, and deeply mindful of the wide-ranging consequences of their 


























 113 See Barr Pre-Trial Detention Memorandum, supra note 53, at 2 (“Each case must be 
evaluated on its own and, where appropriate, the risks the pandemic presents should be part 
of your analysis, as elaborated further below.”) 
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